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The security of a cryptographic key that is generated by communication through a noisy quantum
channel relies on the ability to distill a shorter secure key sequence from a longer insecure one. For an
important class of protocols, which exploit tomographically complete measurements on entangled
pairs of any dimension, we show that the noise threshold for classical advantage distillation is
identical with the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation. As a consequence, the two
distillation procedures are equivalent: neither offers a security advantage over the other.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
The ability to generate a secure cryptographic key, al-
though the communication employs a quantum channel
with a high level of noise, is crucial for all practical imple-
mentations of quantum cryptography. To be on the safe
side, one must assume that all noise results from eaves-
dropping, that eavesdropper Eve has full knowledge of
the cryptographic protocol (the “Kerckhoff principle” of
cryptology), and that she acquires as much knowledge
about the communication as is allowed by the laws of
physics. This leads immediately to the question of where
is the noise threshold below which a secure key can be
generated at all. We give a definite answer for an impor-
tant class of protocols, restricting, however, the discus-
sion to incoherent attacks of the eavesdropper.
In the cryptographic protocol that we consider [1], Al-
ice and Bob exploit entangled pairs of qunits, that is:
n-fold quantum alternatives, the case of n = 2 being the
elementary binary alternative of a qubit. Alice measures
on her qunit, and Bob on his, an observable randomly
chosen from their respective sets of n + 1 observables
that are tomographically complete. Such sets surely ex-
ist for any dimension [2]. Adopting the notation of [3],
we write
∣∣mk〉 for the k-th eigenket of Alice’s m-th ob-
servable and
∣∣mk〉 for the k-th eigenket of Bob’sm-th ob-
servable, whereby m = 0, 1, . . . , n and k = 0, 1, . . . , n−1.
It is possible and expedient to choose these kets such
that
〈
0j
∣∣mk〉 = 〈mk∣∣0j〉 for all m, j, k, and then the
maximally entangled 2-qunit state
∣∣ψ〉 that Alice and
Bob wish to share,
∣∣ψ〉 = 1√
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣0k0k〉 = · · · = 1√
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣nknk〉 , (1)
has the same appearance irrespective of the pair of ob-
servables that is used to define it. Therefore, their mea-
surement results in the matched bases (same value of m
for her and him) are perfectly correlated and can be used
for the generation of a key in an alphabet with n letters.
On average, the measurement bases will be matched for
a fraction 1/(n+1) of the qunit pairs, and these data will
supply the raw key sequence. Alice and Bob use part of it
together with all the other measurement data, acquired
for mismatched bases, to perform quantum tomography
on the two-qunit state they are actually receiving from
the source. The tomographic completeness of the two sets
of observables is crucial for this part of the procedure.
Alice and Bob assume that Eve distributes the qunits.
They accept the raw key only if the result of their
state tomography is consistent with an admixture of the
chaotic state to
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣, thereby forcing Eve to use a
symmetric strategy. In other words, they accept only
a 2-qunit state ρ of the form
ρ = (β0 − β1)
∣∣ψ〉〈ψ∣∣+ β1
n
I , β0 + (n− 1)β1 = 1 , (2)
where I is the 2-qunit identity operator, β0 is the prob-
ability that Bob gets the same value as Alice when the
bases match, and β1 is the probability that he gets a par-
ticular other one. Since β0 = β1 = 1/n when there are
no correlations whatsoever between their measurement
results, we take β0 > 1/n > β1 for granted.
Although Eve fully controls the 2-qunit source, she is
not free in her actions, because the state received by Alice
and Bob must be of the form (2). One finds [1] that,
therefore, the best Eve can do is to prepare an entangled
pure state of the form
∣∣Ψ〉 =
√
β0
n
n−1∑
k=0
∣∣0k0k〉∣∣Ekk〉+
√
β1
n
∑
k 6=l
∣∣0k0l〉∣∣Ekl〉 , (3)
where her normalized ancilla states
∣∣Ekl〉 are such that
those with k 6= l are orthogonal to all others, whereas
those with k = l are not orthogonal among themselves,
but obey
〈
Ekk
∣∣Ell〉 = 1 − (β1/β0)(1 − δkl). Thus the
2summations in (3) constitute two orthogonal components
of
∣∣Ψ〉. The n-dimensional first component is relevant for
establishing the cryptographic key, the n(n − 1)-dimen-
sional second component is just noise to Alice and Bob.
We note that the invariance of
∣∣ψ〉 under bases permu-
tations is also possessed by
∣∣Ψ〉. Rather than referring to
the 0-th pair of observables, we could just as well use the
joint eigenkets
∣∣mkml〉 of any other pair in conjunction
with a suitable unitary redefinition of the ancilla states.
After Alice and Bob have given public notice of the
observables they measured for each qunit pair, it is
Eve’s task to infer their measurement results—their nit
values—whenever the bases match. To this end she must
be able to identify her ancilla states. (Remember that we
are only considering incoherent eavesdropping attacks.)
Owing to the structure of
∣∣Ψ〉 she can distinguish unam-
biguously all the states belonging to the second orthogo-
nal component, and so she can correctly infer Alice’s and
Bob’s nit values if they are different. But if they are the
same, Eve has to distinguish the
∣∣Ekk〉 of the first com-
ponent, and then she cannot avoid errors because these
states are not orthogonal to each other. In this situation,
she minimizes her error probability by performing the so
called square-root measurement [4].
We denote by η0 and η1 = (1 − η0)/(n− 1) the prob-
abilities that Eve infers the nit value correctly or gets a
particular wrong one, respectively, provided that Bob’s
nit value is the same as Alice’s. They are related to Bob’s
probabilities β0 and β1 of (2) by
√
η0 −√η1 =
√
β1/β0 . (4)
Note that this expresses a certain complementarity be-
tween Bob’s and Eve’s respective knowledge about Al-
ice’s nit values. If Bob’s values agree perfectly with Al-
ice’s (β0 = 1, β1 = 0), then Eve’s values are completely
random (η0 = η1 = 1/n), and conversely η0 = 1, η1 = 0
implies β0 = β1 = 1/n. In the more interesting interme-
diate situations we have η0 > 1/n > η1.
For single-particle protocols with qubits (n = 2) or
qutrits (n = 3), the relation (4) is well established [5, 6],
and has been conjectured to hold for arbitrary dimensions
[5, 7]. This conjecture is proved in [1].
According to the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner (CK) Theorem [8], a
secure key sequence can be extracted from the raw key
sequence if the mutual information between Alice and
Bob exceeds the mutual information between either one
of them and Eve. This requires that Bob’s and Eve’s
probabilities are such that
ν ≡ β0 logn β0 + (1 − β0) logn β1
−β0
[
η0 logn η0 + (1 − η0) logn η1
]
> 0 , (5)
and then ν is the yield of the CK procedure, the fraction
of nit values that make it from the raw key sequence to
the secure one. Since (4) implies that η0, η1 → 1/n as
β0 → 1, this condition is surely met if β0 is sufficiently
large. If, however, there is too much noise in the 2-qunit
state (2), the CK theorem is not immediately applicable.
Rather, Alice and Bob must select a subsequence of nit
values in a systematic way such that the CK theorem
applies to the resulting “distilled key.”
One method at their disposal for this purpose is en-
tanglement distillation (ED), a quantum procedure by
which they produce a smaller number of qunit pairs with
stronger entanglement, by means of local operations and
classical communication [9]. Thus they can reach a β0
value for which the CK theorem is applicable, before they
measure their respective observables. For states of the
particularly simple structure (2), ED will be successful if
β0 > 2β1 (6)
and only then [10]. If Eve can perfectly compensate for
the back effect of ED on the ancillas, relation (4) also
applies after ED. If she cannot, it turns into an inequality,
tersely: =→<.
Alternatively, Alice and Bob can produce their raw key
sequences without any subensemble selection, and then
perform advantage distillation (AD), a procedure of clas-
sical (i.e. non-quantum) cryptography [11]. As we shall
see below, for β0, η0 values that obey (4), AD is successful
whenever (6) holds, and only then, so that the thresholds
for ED and AD are the same [12]. As a consequence of
this coincidence, ED and AD are equivalent in the sense
that neither offers a security advantage over the other.
Both ED and AD require classical two-way commu-
nication, but once the CK theorem becomes applicable,
one-way communication suffices. We leave it as a moot
point which method makes better use of the resources
because the standard versions of both are very wasteful
and hardly suited for practical implementation [13].
The AD protocol is as follows. Alice and Bob divide
their raw strings of nit values into blocks of length L. For
each block, Alice casts a n-sided die and then adds, mod-
ulo n, the random value thus found to the given block.
Then she sends these modified blocks to Bob through a
public, but authenticated channel. Bob subtracts, mod-
ulo n, his corresponding blocks. Whenever he obtains a
block consisting of L identical nit values, he enters this
value into his distilled sequence. If, however, different
values appear in a block, he disregards it. He tells Alice,
through the public channel, which blocks contribute to
the distilled key and which don’t. She in turn then forms
her own distilled sequence from the random values that
she added to the blocks that Bob did not discard.
The two distilled sequences are identical, except at the
rare positions, where Bob’s whole block consisted of L
wrong nit values of the same kind. Since there are n− 1
different wrong nit values, the relative frequency with
which a particular one occurs in the distilled sequence is
BL =
βL1
βL0 + (n− 1)βL1
, (7)
3which is, so to say, the new value of β1 after AD. Since
β1 < β0, BL decreases exponentially with the block
length L,
lim
L→∞
BL+1
BL
=
β1
β0
. (8)
Whenever Alice and Bob end up with a pair of different
nit values after AD, Eve knows both values correctly,
because she knows the values for each nit pair of the
two blocks in question. But when Alice and Bob get the
same value, which is the much more frequent situation
for long blocks, Eve cannot be completely sure about
any nit value in the blocks. Her best strategy is then
to subtract Alice’s block from her corresponding block,
that is, to do what Bob does. Typically, Eve’s block
is inhomogeneous after the subtraction, and it is highly
likely that the correct nit value is the value that occurs
more often than any other. So, she decides by a majority
vote which nit value to assign: She bets on the value
that appears most frequently in the block, and if there
are several most frequent values, she picks one of them
at random.
To find her probability for assigning the right value,
we first note that a block with m correct values and k1,
k2, . . . , kn−1 ones of the n− 1 wrong kinds, respectively,
occurs with a relative frequency that is given by
L! ηm0 η
L−m
1
m!k1! · · · kn−1!δL−m,k1+k2+···+kn−1
=
(
L
m
)
ηm0
(
∂
∂x
)L−m n−1∏
j=1
(η1x)
kj
kj !
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=0
, (9)
where the Kronecker delta symbol enforces the constraint
L−m = k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kn−1.
Second, we note that Eve surely assigns a wrong value
wheneverm < max{k1, . . . , kn−1}, and in the situation of
m ≥ max{k1, . . . , kn−1} she assigns the right value with
probability 1/(l+1) where l is the count of kj ’s that are
equal to m. With the combinatorial factor(
n− 1
l
)
=
(
n
l + 1
)
l + 1
n
(10)
taken into account, the summation overm and all kj thus
gives
1− (n− 1)EL =
L∑
m=0
(
L
m
)
ηm0
(
∂
∂x
)L−m
× 1
n
n−1∑
l=0
(
n
l + 1
)[
(η1x)
m
m!
]l [m−1∑
k=0
(η1x)
k
k!
]n−1−l
∣∣∣
x = 0
(11)
for the probability that Eve assigns the right nit value
to a string of length L, and EL is then the probability
that she gets a particular one of the n− 1 wrong values.
Parroting the remark after (7), we note that EL is, so to
say, the new value of η1 after AD.
We use the generating function
E(t) ≡
∞∑
L=0
tL
L!
EL (12)
to deal with these probabilities as a set. It is given by
E(t) =
et
n− 1
∞∑
m=0
(η0t)
m
m!
e−η0t
×
(
1−
[
wm(η1t)
]n − [wm−1(η1t)]n
n
[
wm(η1t)− wm−1(η1t)
]
)
(13)
where
wm(x) =
m∑
k=0
xk
k!
e−x (14)
is the partially summed Poisson distribution.
For the comparison with (8), the quantity of primary
interest is the limit
lim
L→∞
EL+1
EL
= lim
t→∞
∂
∂t
logE(t) , (15)
which directs our attention to the large-t behavior of
E(t). Now, for large t the Poisson distribution in m, by
which the parenthesized difference is weighted in (13),
has its peak at m ≃ η0t > η1t, and the relative width of
this peak shrinks with growing t. Accordingly, all rele-
vant contributions to the sum in (13) have m > η1t, so
that the approximation
wm(η1t) = wm−1(η1t) +
(η1t)
m
m!
e−η1t ≃ 1 (16)
is permissible, and
E(t) ≃ 1
2
e(1−η0−η1)t I0(2
√
η0η1 t) for t≫ 1 (17)
obtains. Since there is no difference between the modified
Bessel function I0(z) and its derivative I1(z) when z ≫ 1,
this tells us that
lim
L→∞
EL+1
EL
= 1− (√η0 −√η1 )2 . (18)
In conjunction with (8), it follows that AD of this kind
will be successful if
β1
β0
< 1− (√η0 −√η1 )2 (19)
holds because then Bob’s error probability gets exponen-
tially smaller than Eve’s with increasing block length L,
and the distilled key sequence will meet the requirements
of the CK theorem if L is chosen large enough. Now, if
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FIG. 1: The three-fold coincidence, for n = 5, in a plot of
Bob’s probability β0 vs. Eve’s probability η0. The relevant
values of β0 > 1/n and η0 > 1/n are outside the gray area.
The dash-dotted curve a identifies the β0, η0 pairs for which
(4) holds. To the right of the dashed vertical line b, condi-
tion (6) is obeyed and ED is possible. By contrast, AD can
be successfully performed below the solid-line curve c which
marks the border stated in (19). All three lines intersect at
β0 = 1/3 = 0.33, η0 = (11 + 4
√
6)/25 = 0.83, so that the
part of curve a that is to the right of curve b is also the part
that is below curve c. — The CK theorem is applicable to
β0, η0 values below the dotted curve d that results from (5).
It intersects curve a at β0 = 0.708, η0 = 0.470. From there, a
single ED step takes one to the ⋄ point on curve a, whereas
AD with L = 2 moves one horizontally to the ⋄ point further
right (see [13]).
(4) relates Eve’s probabilities to Bob’s, as it is the case
for the probabilities originating in Eve’s source state (3),
the threshold condition (19) for classical AD is, indeed,
identical with the threshold condition (6) for quantum
ED, as we have asserted above. This remarkable coinci-
dence is illustrated in Fig. 1.
It is important to note that, despite its simplicity and
its lack of efficiency, the AD scheme considered correctly
identifies the threshold point on curve a in Fig. 1. For, if
(β0, η0) is to the left of the triple-coincidence point, the
2-qunit state (2) is separable. Eve can then blend it from
product states and can so ensure that there is no useful
mutual information between Alice and Bob, and without
it they cannot generate a secure key.
For n = 3, a more involved argument about the same
matter is given in [7]. In fact, while our paper was being
written, we became aware of [7] where some of our results
are conjectured and identical conclusions are reached.
One wonders, of course, whether the surprising equiva-
lence between classical and quantum distillation is more
than just the coincidence as which it appears here and
in [7]. Perhaps it hints at a deeper connection between
these fundamentally different procedures.
Finally, one might wonder if Eve has a better procedure
at her disposal than the square-root measurement that
is the basis of our analysis. For the following reasons
we think she does not. The error-minimizing strategy
takes full advantage of the built-in symmetry of the to-
mographic protocol. For all other fully symmetric eaves-
dropping attacks, the CK region is reached at smaller β0
values, and successful AD is possible for all of them if
the ED threshold (6) is crossed [14]. It seems, therefore,
rather reasonable that the error-minimizing strategy is
Eve’s optimal choice.
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